The EU’s Dual Identity in Eurasia: Between Strategic Autonomy and Transatlantic Loyalty

Introduction: Why Multipolarity and Eurasia Matter

The global order is undergoing a profound transformation. The unipolar moment dominated by the United States is giving way to a more complex, multipolar configuration, where multiple power centers—including China, Russia, India, and the European Union (EU)—vie for influence. This shift represents more than just a redistribution of power; it signals a fundamental restructuring of international relations, trade patterns, and governance frameworks that have defined the post-Cold War era.

The emergence of alternative institutions like BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and regional development banks demonstrates that non-Western powers are no longer content to operate within Western-designed systems.

Eurasia, as the world’s largest and most interconnected landmass, lies at the heart of this emerging multipolarity. Yet the EU’s role in this unfolding landscape remains ambiguous: is it an autonomous pole in its own right, or merely a junior partner within the Western bloc? The continent spans from the Atlantic shores of Portugal to the Pacific coasts of Russia, encompassing diverse civilizations, energy resources, and emerging markets that together represent the majority of global economic activity. For the EU, Eurasia is not a distant strategic concern but an immediate geographical reality that shapes everything from energy security to migration patterns, trade relationships to security threats.

The EU’s Strategic Dilemma

The EU stands as an economic titan, boasting the world’s largest single market and a collective GDP rivaling that of the U.S. or China. However, it remains a military dwarf, heavily dependent on NATO and, by extension, American strategic protection. This asymmetry creates a fundamental tension in EU foreign policy: while Brussels can leverage economic tools like sanctions, trade agreements, and regulatory standards to influence global affairs, it lacks the hard power capabilities to back up its diplomatic initiatives when faced with military threats or coercion. The EU’s defense spending, while substantial in aggregate, remains fragmented across 27 national militaries with limited interoperability and strategic coordination.

This imbalance has become increasingly visible in the context of great power rivalry, leaving the EU caught between its economic interests in Eurasia and its security commitments to the transatlantic alliance. The situation has been exacerbated by successive U.S. administrations’ calls for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defense while simultaneously expecting continued loyalty to American strategic priorities. The result is a European Union that often finds itself implementing policies that serve Washington’s interests rather than optimizing its own economic and diplomatic relationships, particularly with rising powers in Asia and the Middle East that view the EU’s subordination to U.S. foreign policy as a limitation on potential partnerships.

Internal Divisions: France vs. Eastern Europe

The tension within the EU itself exacerbates this dilemma. France, under President Emmanuel Macron, has championed the idea of “strategic autonomy,” envisioning an EU capable of acting independently on the world stage. Macron’s vision encompasses not only military independence but also technological sovereignty, monetary autonomy, and the ability to engage with global powers without requiring Washington’s approval. This French-led push for autonomy reflects a historical Gaulliste tradition of independence and a recognition that Europe’s interests do not always align perfectly with those of the United States, particularly in relations with China, Russia, and emerging economies.

In contrast, many Eastern European states—Poland, the Baltic countries, Romania—remain staunchly Atlanticist, viewing the U.S. as the ultimate guarantor of their sovereignty, especially in light of Russian aggression. These countries’ historical experience of Soviet domination and their continued perception of Russia as an existential threat makes them deeply suspicious of any European initiative that might weaken the transatlantic bond. For them, strategic autonomy risks creating dangerous daylight between Europe and America that Moscow could exploit.

This fundamental disagreement about threat perception and strategic priorities creates a persistent fault line within the EU, making it difficult to develop a coherent foreign policy that satisfies both French ambitions for independence and Eastern European demands for American protection.

Economic Cooperation vs. Strategic Obedience

Nowhere is this contradiction starker than in the EU’s relationship with China. Despite U.S. calls for “decoupling,” the EU remains deeply economically intertwined with Beijing. China is a top trading partner for many EU countries, supplying critical components and serving as a key export market. European companies like Volkswagen, BASF, and Airbus have invested billions in the Chinese market and built complex supply chains that cannot be easily disentangled. The relationship extends beyond trade to include cooperation in areas like climate change, where China and the EU often find themselves aligned against American positions, and technology transfer agreements that benefit both sides despite U.S. concerns about European companies inadvertently strengthening Chinese capabilities.

However, this interdependence has come under increasing strain as Washington urges Brussels to align more closely with its Indo-Pacific strategy. The pressure intensified following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the U.S. argued that economic interdependence with authoritarian powers represents a strategic vulnerability that can be weaponized during crises. European policymakers now face an increasingly difficult choice: maintain profitable economic relationships with China that support European competitiveness and employment, or sacrifice these ties to demonstrate solidarity with the United States and potentially gain greater influence over American policy in other areas. The tension is particularly acute in high-technology sectors where Chinese and American demands for exclusive partnerships force European companies to choose sides in a technological cold war.

Energy Ties and the Russia Question

Before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the EU’s cautious engagement with Russia was underpinned by deep energy ties—particularly Germany’s reliance on Russian natural gas. The relationship represented a cornerstone of European energy security, with Russia supplying approximately 40% of the EU’s gas imports through an extensive pipeline network that took decades to build. This energy interdependence was seen by many European leaders as a stabilizing factor that gave both sides incentives to maintain peaceful relations, embodying the liberal belief that economic integration reduces the likelihood of conflict by creating mutual vulnerabilities and shared interests.

The war has forced a painful decoupling, but it also reveals the long-standing contradiction at the heart of EU-Russia relations: economic logic suggested cooperation, but geopolitical alignment leaned toward confrontation. The rapid pivot away from Russian energy, while demonstrating European resolve and unity, has come at enormous economic cost, contributing to inflation, industrial competitiveness challenges, and energy security concerns that will persist for years. The experience has prompted fundamental questions about the relationship between economic interdependence and strategic autonomy, with some arguing that Europe’s energy dependence on Russia was a strategic mistake that compromised its foreign policy independence, while others contend that the economic benefits justified the risks and that complete decoupling from major powers is neither feasible nor desirable in an interconnected world.

Germany’s Historical Balancing Act

Germany offers a revealing case study. Its post-Cold War strategy was built on Wandel durch Handel (“change through trade”), particularly with China and Russia. This approach reflected Germany’s historical experience, economic interests, and philosophical belief that engagement and trade could gradually transform authoritarian systems from within while providing mutual benefits. German companies became deeply embedded in both Chinese and Russian markets, with major corporations like Siemens, BMW, and SAP building substantial operations that employed hundreds of thousands of workers and generated billions in revenue. The strategy appeared vindicated by China’s economic liberalization and integration into global markets, even as political reforms lagged behind economic changes.

Yet since 2022, Berlin has faced intense pressure from Washington to reduce its economic exposure to authoritarian powers. The result is a hesitant recalibration, torn between economic pragmatism and geopolitical loyalty. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s administration has struggled to balance domestic economic interests, particularly from German industry and labor unions concerned about job losses and competitiveness, with international pressure to demonstrate solidarity with democratic allies. The internal debate reflects broader German uncertainty about its role in a multipolar world: should Germany prioritize its identity as a Western democracy aligned with the United States, or should it embrace its geographical position at the center of Eurasia and act as a bridge between different systems and civilizations?

Eurasia as a Bridge or Battleground

The EU’s position in Eurasia oscillates between being a bridge and a battleground. On one hand, it seeks to promote connectivity projects like the “Middle Corridor” through Turkey and Central Asia as alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These initiatives reflect a European vision of Eurasia as an integrated economic space where the EU can leverage its regulatory standards, technological expertise, and financial resources to shape development patterns according to liberal democratic principles. The bridge concept emphasizes Europe’s unique position as the western terminus of the Eurasian landmass, naturally connected to both Asian and Middle Eastern markets through historical trade routes and cultural exchanges.

On the other, the region is also a site of intensified geopolitical rivalry, where competing infrastructure, energy, and digital governance schemes reflect broader struggles for influence. The battleground perspective sees Eurasia as a zero-sum competition between different models of development and governance, where European engagement must be designed to counter Chinese and Russian influence rather than create genuine multilateral cooperation.

This approach emphasizes the need for the EU to compete more aggressively for influence in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and other regions where Chinese investment and Russian security partnerships are changing the balance of power. The tension between these two approaches—bridge-building versus competition—reflects the broader uncertainty about whether multipolarity can be managed cooperatively or will inevitably lead to conflict.

The Middle Corridor: A Strategic Pivot?

The Middle Corridor, backed by the EU, links Europe to Central Asia via the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, bypassing Russia. While still nascent, it reflects the EU’s desire to create new east-west connections that reduce dependency on traditional routes dominated by Moscow or Beijing.

The project involves upgrading ports, railways, and digital infrastructure across multiple countries, requiring complex multilateral coordination and substantial financial investment. European officials see the Middle Corridor as more than just a transportation route; it represents a strategic reorientation that could reshape trade patterns, reduce European dependence on Russian energy and transportation networks, and provide Central Asian countries with alternatives to Chinese and Russian economic partnerships.

It’s a subtle but significant step toward greater Eurasian engagement on the EU’s own terms. However, the project faces substantial challenges, including political instability in key transit countries, competition from established Chinese infrastructure projects, and skepticism from some European member states about the wisdom of major investments in regions with uncertain returns.

The success of the Middle Corridor will test the EU’s ability to translate its economic resources into geopolitical influence, and to demonstrate that European approaches to development and connectivity can compete effectively with Chinese and Russian alternatives. The project also represents a test of European strategic thinking: can the EU move beyond reactive policies designed primarily to counter other powers and develop proactive initiatives that create new realities on the ground?

Multipolarity vs. Atlanticism

The core question remains: can the EU navigate multipolarity without betraying transatlantic loyalty? For now, Brussels seeks to walk a tightrope—engaging with China and other non-Western powers on trade and infrastructure, while reaffirming its alignment with NATO on security. This balancing act reflects the EU’s recognition that the emerging multipolar order requires engagement with all major powers, not just traditional allies, while also acknowledging that European security still depends heavily on American military capabilities and strategic commitments.

The challenge is particularly acute in areas where American and European interests diverge, such as trade with Iran, cooperation with China on climate change, or engagement with emerging economies that maintain neutral positions in great power competition. But the pressure to choose sides is mounting, especially in Washington. American policymakers increasingly view European hedging strategies with suspicion, arguing that half-hearted support for American positions undermines the effectiveness of Western responses to authoritarian challenges.

This pressure is likely to intensify as competition with China deepens and as domestic American politics becomes more focused on great power rivalry. European leaders must decide whether continued accommodation of American preferences is sustainable in the long term, or whether the costs of subordination to U.S. foreign policy priorities are beginning to outweigh the benefits of transatlantic protection. The decision will shape not only European foreign policy but also the broader architecture of the international system.

The Rise of a Reform Movement

The EU’s internal political landscape complicates this balancing act. Both right-wing and left-wing populist movements are skeptical of U.S. dominance, NATO interventions, and liberal economic orthodoxy. These movements, while diverse in their specific ideologies and policy preferences, share a common critique of what they see as European subservience to American interests and the costs this imposes on European sovereignty, economic prosperity, and cultural identity.

Right-wing populists like Marine Le Pen in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy have called for closer ties with Russia and greater distance from NATO, while left-wing movements across Europe have criticized American military interventions and economic policies that they argue serve Wall Street rather than European workers.

Parties in Hungary, Italy, France, and even Germany have questioned Brussels’ subordination to Washington, opening the door to a more multipolar orientation in future policymaking. This internal political pressure creates additional constraints on EU foreign policy, as Brussels must consider not only external pressures from Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, but also domestic political movements that may punish leaders who are seen as too accommodating to American demands or insufficiently protective of European interests.