RIC as a Geostrategic Concept
The Russia–India–China (RIC) triangle is not a newly emerging framework but a dormant one experiencing new attempts at revival. Originally articulated by former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in the late 1990s, RIC was designed as a strategic counterweight to unipolar U.S. hegemony post–Cold War. The idea sought to establish a multipolar world order through a triad of powerful Eurasian states—each with historical grievances, ambitions, and mutual dependencies. The current context, marked by rising global polarization, Ukraine and Taiwan crises, and economic decoupling, has reignited interest in reactivating the RIC framework as a geopolitical necessity for Moscow and, cautiously, for Beijing.
President Vladimir Putin’s outreach to India in 2025, as highlighted in the Times of India, reflects a pivot away from over-dependence on China and a search for strategic plurality. Facing increasing Western isolation due to the war in Ukraine, sanctions, and diplomatic expulsion from European institutions, Moscow is re-evaluating its Asian policy. The “India pivot” is more than symbolism; it includes robust defense offers, the operationalization of the Chennai–Vladivostok corridor, and public signals from Lavrov and other Russian officials reaffirming RIC as a long-term strategic idea.
India’s response is characterized by pragmatism. While it has refused to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and continues buying discounted Russian oil, India is wary of being drawn too closely into an entente that includes China. India’s doctrine of “strategic autonomy” resists both U.S.-led alliances and Sino-Russian strategic pressure. The Indian elite views RIC cooperation through a cost-benefit lens, where engagement with Russia must not come at the price of its own security or undermine its Indo-Pacific aspirations alongside the Quad (U.S., Japan, Australia).
From the Chinese perspective, RIC remains a useful, if limited, diplomatic tool. Chinese commentary from 环球网 (Huanqiu) and 观察者网 (Guanchazhe) recognizes the value of India in diversifying Eurasian partnerships, but Beijing understands Delhi’s deep skepticism. China subtly supports Moscow’s initiative, particularly to showcase alternatives to Western blocs and dilute Washington’s Asia strategy. However, it is under no illusion that India will join any firm Beijing-led political alignment. The Galwan Valley clashes (2020) and unresolved border tensions still cast a long shadow.
Structural Impediments to Deeper RIC Integration
Despite formal statements, RIC faces deep structural contradictions. India’s discomfort with China is irreconcilable in the near term. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which cuts through Kashmir, is anathema to India. Russia, though nominally neutral, increasingly sides with China on Eurasian connectivity, further complicating Delhi’s position. Without trust, trilateralism cannot go beyond dialogue forums.
Russia continues to act as the main adhesive in this trilateral format, primarily through defense and energy deals. Moscow is offering India fifth-generation fighter technology (Su-57) and even allowing local production—an unprecedented gesture aimed at maintaining defense dependency. Moreover, bilateral trade has soared past $27 billion, primarily through oil and fertilizer imports. While China is Russia’s largest trade partner, Moscow values India’s market not just for diversification but for demonstrating that it’s not isolated in Asia.
Chennai–Vladivostok Maritime Corridor and Strategic Logistics
The operationalization of the Chennai–Vladivostok maritime corridor in late 2024 marks a concrete step toward closer Russo-Indian logistical cooperation. Unlike the more politically controversial International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), this project avoids the Iran bottleneck and reduces sea transit time significantly. It serves both as a symbol of South Asian–Far East connectivity and as a tool to deepen institutional engagement, particularly in energy and shipping industries.
The BRICS and SCO Connection
RIC doesn’t exist in isolation; it overlaps with multilateral platforms like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Russia and China dominate the SCO, where India is a full member but often diplomatically marginalized. In BRICS, however, India has more room for maneuver, especially in debates about currency alternatives to the U.S. dollar. The challenge remains turning these platforms from discussion forums into policy-driving institutions. RIC, in its current form, lacks enforcement mechanisms and suffers from bilateral frictions.
Chinese sources indicate a generally warm but strategically ambiguous view of Russia’s India outreach. Beijing understands that Russia’s move is pragmatic, not ideological. The Chinese-Russian axis, though tight on the surface—especially on military drills and energy—is not without internal competition. Russia remains wary of becoming the junior partner, and its India policy is one way of showing that it retains sovereign decision-making. Still, Chinese media have not voiced opposition to the RIC revival, signaling silent approval.
Russia’s ultimate objective is a multipolar Eurasia where it sits at the center of overlapping regional partnerships—BRICS, SCO, CSTO, EAEU, and possibly a rejuvenated RIC. But this requires flexibility, especially from partners like India, who have a different strategic language. The inclusion of India in this triangle helps Moscow hedge against becoming overly dependent on China, which has become a necessary but risky partner since the Ukraine war.
India stands at a critical juncture. It can either use RIC forums to project its vision for a non-aligned multipolar Asia, or it can remain cautious, participating symbolically but aligning elsewhere. With rising border tensions with China and Western support pouring in, Delhi’s incentives for deep RIC engagement are low. However, ignoring RIC may allow Russia and China to reshape the region’s architecture without Indian input, potentially against its interests.
Non-Eurasian interferance
The United States is monitoring the RIC revival with caution. Washington has quietly pressured India to distance itself from Russian arms purchases, particularly through CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act). While India has resisted such pressures, future escalations—such as deeper Indo-Russian missile cooperation—could strain U.S.–India ties. This creates a paradox where India uses RIC diplomacy to balance China while simultaneously deepening cooperation with the U.S. to balance China and Russia.
Pragmatism Over Ideology
Beyond military and trade, RIC’s potential also lies in soft power and education. Russia continues to fund scholarships for Indian and Chinese students, and trilateral cultural forums exist, though they are underused. Track-II diplomacy (academic, journalistic, and civil society exchanges) remains an area ripe for development. If the RIC is to move beyond transactionalism, it must invest in these long-term avenues of engagement.
RIC is not a bloc in the traditional sense. It is better understood as a diplomatic instrument shaped by necessity and opportunity. Russia sees it as a way out of isolation. China sees it as a useful forum to dilute Western pressure. India sees it as a space for limited engagement with the potential to shape multipolarity. Its revival in 2025 is a reflection of broader Eurasian fragmentation and realignment, but whether it evolves into a force for integration or remains a symbolic nod to multipolarity will depend on how well the three powers manage their competing interests.
The future of RIC depends on whether the three states can convert tactical alignment into strategic trust. So far, the format remains transactional—defense deals, oil imports, and periodic summits. For transformational cooperation, RIC would need institutional frameworks, regular trilateral military and academic exchanges, and joint infrastructure projects. The path to such transformation is long and riddled with mistrust.
Bibliography
- The Times of India. “Inside Putin’s India Pivot: Why Russia is Trying to Woo New Delhi into Alliance with China” Times of India, June 2025. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com
- South China Morning Post. “Why China and Russia Want India in Their Corner” SCMP, March 2025.
- Al Jazeera. “India’s Balancing Act Between Russia, China, and the West” Al Jazeera English, May 2022.
- Reuters. “Putin and Xi pledge a new era and condemn the United States” Reuters, May 2024.
- The Diplomat. “The US Factor in the Russia-India-China Troika’s Revival?” The Diplomat, June 2025.
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