Turkey’s geopolitical identity is deeply rooted in its Ottoman past. As Prof. Zan Tao emphasizes, the Ottoman Empire was not merely a geopolitical power but a civilizational hub of Islamic governance, culture, and trade. This legacy endures in Turkey’s modern foreign policy, which seeks to reclaim influence in regions once under Ottoman rule—the Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia. For instance, Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) has expanded its footprint in the Balkans through mosque construction and educational programs, positioning Ankara as a guardian of Sunni Islam. Similarly, in Central Asia, Turkey promotes Turkic cultural ties via the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), institutionalizing historical bonds to counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence.
This civilizational outreach is further operationalized through economic tools that mirror historical trade routes. The revival of the “Silk Road” ethos is not just a Chinese project; Turkey actively promotes infrastructure investments and trade agreements that echo Ottoman-era commercial networks. By financing transport corridors and energy pipelines across the Balkans and the Caucasus, Ankara is physically reinscribing its historical sphere of influence, creating modern dependencies rooted in a shared past.
However, this neo-Ottoman narrative is not universally welcomed. In regions like the Balkans, memories of imperial domination coexist with cultural affinity. Nations such as Greece and Serbia actively resist Turkey’s historical framing, viewing it as a form of soft imperialism. This creates a complex diplomatic landscape where Turkey must carefully calibrate its actions to avoid reviving historical animosities, demonstrating that leveraging a grand legacy requires navigating the equally powerful legacies of conflict and resistance.
Russia-Ukraine War: Mediation and Strategic Maneuvering
Turkey’s role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict exemplifies its dual strategy of mediation and assertive diplomacy. Unlike Western powers, Ankara maintains open channels with both Kyiv and Moscow, hosting peace talks while supplying Ukraine with drones and military equipment. This balance allows Turkey to position itself as a neutral broker, enhancing its regional clout. Simultaneously, Turkey seeks to reduce energy dependence on Russia by diversifying imports from Azerbaijan and Central Asia, aligning with its broader goal of strategic autonomy. Russia, however, views Turkey’s Central Asian outreach with suspicion, fearing a pan-Turkic alliance that could erode its influence in post-Soviet states.
A key manifestation of this balancing act is the Montreux Convention, which grants Turkey control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. By strategically invoking the Convention to limit the passage of warships, Ankara demonstrated its legal and military authority as the gatekeeper of the Black Sea. This move reinforced its neutrality while curtailing Russian naval power, a masterstroke of leveraging geographic fortune into tangible geopolitical influence without directly engaging in hostilities.
The war has also presented Turkey with significant economic opportunities amidst the diplomatic tightrope. As Western sanctions crippled Russian trade routes, Turkey became a crucial hub for the transfer of dual-use goods and a facilitator of Russian financial transactions. This has provided a short-term economic boost, but it risks drawing the ire of NATO allies and potentially triggering secondary sanctions. Thus, Turkey’s profitable neutrality is a high-stakes gamble, testing the limits of its alliance and its ability to profit from a conflict it officially seeks to mediate.
Neo-Ottomanism: Resurrecting Historical Ties
President Erdoğan’s vision of neo-Ottomanism drives Turkey’s revivalist foreign policy. By reviving historical connections in the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East, Ankara aims to project soft power through cultural and religious diplomacy. In Africa, Turkish NGOs and businesses have invested in infrastructure and education, while in Somalia, Turkey operates a military base and provides humanitarian aid. These efforts resonate with populations sharing Ottoman-era historical memories, though they risk alienating rival powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia, which perceive Turkey’s Sunni-centric approach as a challenge to their own religious influence.
Beyond soft power, Turkey has demonstrated a willingness to deploy hard power to protect its perceived sphere of influence, most notably in its military interventions in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. These actions signal a departure from Turkey’s previously cautious foreign policy and a return to a more assertive, Ottoman-style regional policing role. The use of advanced drones, branded as “cheap and effective,” has not only reshaped regional battlefields but also marketed Turkey as a formidable military partner and arms exporter, adding a sharp edge to its cultural and religious diplomacy.
Yet, this ambitious expansion is constrained by domestic economic vulnerabilities. Chronic inflation and currency depreciation threaten the sustainability of Turkey’s foreign ventures. Funding military expeditions, rebuilding foreign infrastructure, and supporting a vast network of NGOs places a significant burden on the national treasury. The success of neo-Ottomanism, therefore, is intrinsically linked to Erdoğan’s ability to stabilize the Turkish economy, proving that grand strategic visions cannot be divorced from fiscal realities.
Central Asia: Cultural Diplomacy and Economic Leverage
Central Asia has emerged as a focal point for Turkey’s post-Soviet outreach. Since the 1990s, Ankara has cultivated ties with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan through trade, education, and cultural exchanges. The 2023 Central Asia Barometer survey highlights Turkey’s favorable image in the region, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, where Turkish goods and diplomatic visits enjoy prominence. Energy diversification further motivates Turkey’s engagement: Kazakhstan’s oil and Turkmenistan’s gas reserves offer alternatives to Russian supplies, aligning with Ankara’s goal of becoming a transit hub via projects like the Middle Corridor.
Turkey’s cultural diplomacy in Central Asia extends beyond economics to encompass educational and linguistic initiatives. Turkish-funded universities, such as branches of educational institutions modeled after the Gülen movement schools (prior to 2016) and state-sponsored programs, have educated thousands of Central Asian students, creating networks of influence that persist across generations. The promotion of the Turkish language and cultural festivals celebrating shared Turkic heritage reinforce Ankara’s position as the natural leader of the Turkic world. Turkish television series and popular culture have also penetrated Central Asian markets, creating soft power resources that complement hard economic investments.
However, Turkey’s ambitions in Central Asia face significant obstacles. Russia views the region as its historical sphere of influence and has responded to Turkish initiatives with economic pressure and political maneuvering through the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. China’s massive Belt and Road investments dwarf Turkey’s economic capacity, while Iran competes for influence in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, Central Asian governments remain cautious about over-reliance on any single external power, preferring to maintain strategic flexibility. Turkey’s challenge lies in demonstrating sustained commitment and tangible benefits while navigating the sensitivities of established regional powers.
China: Economic Partnerships and Strategic Ambiguity
China views Turkey as a critical partner in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offering investment and political leverage to counterbalance U.S. influence. For Turkey, closer ties with Beijing provide economic benefits and a pathway to bridge Asia and Europe. However, Turkey’s NATO membership complicates this relationship. While China seeks to draw Ankara away from the Western camp, Turkey maintains a cautious balance, leveraging its strategic position to extract concessions from both sides. This duality enhances Turkey’s leverage within NATO, positioning it as an indispensable link between continents.
The Sino-Turkish relationship has deepened significantly in infrastructure and defense sectors. Chinese companies have invested in Turkish ports, railways, and energy projects, while Turkey has shown interest in Chinese military technology, including missile defense systems. Trade volume between the two nations has grown substantially, with Turkey seeking to reduce its trade deficit through increased exports of agricultural products and industrial goods. Beijing views Turkey as a crucial western terminus of the BRI, essential for connecting Chinese commerce to European markets through the Middle Corridor, which bypasses Russia and offers faster transit times than traditional routes.
Yet fundamental tensions persist beneath the surface of pragmatic cooperation. The situation of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang represents a profound dilemma for Ankara. Turkey’s domestic constituency and Islamic identity create pressure to criticize Chinese policies, but economic dependency and geopolitical calculations compel restraint. Turkey’s occasional statements on Uyghur rights have drawn sharp rebukes from Beijing, forcing Turkish leaders to walk a diplomatic tightrope. Additionally, Turkey’s security relationship with the United States, despite tensions, remains far deeper than any potential partnership with China, limiting how far Ankara can move toward Beijing without triggering Western sanctions or loss of NATO benefits. This structural constraint ensures that Turkey-China relations, while expanding, will remain bounded by Turkey’s Western institutional commitments.
Iran: Rivalry and Limited Cooperation
Turkey-Iran relations oscillate between cooperation and competition. Both nations pursue “zero problems” policies with neighbors, yet their divergent approaches to Syria and the Arab Awakening strain ties. Iran views Turkey’s Central Asian outreach as a threat to its own influence, while Turkey perceives Iran’s religiosity and historical rivalry as obstacles to deeper engagement. Economic ties, particularly in energy trade, persist, but mutual distrust limits strategic alignment. Russia’s attempts to balance Turkish and Iranian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia further complicate this tripartite dynamic.
The sectarian dimension of Turkey-Iran competition manifests most clearly in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, where Turkey’s support for Sunni factions directly opposes Iran’s backing of Shia militias and governments. In Syria, Turkey’s presence in Idlib and northern territories challenges Iranian ambitions for a land corridor to the Mediterranean, while in Iraq, both compete for influence over the post-ISIS political landscape. Despite these conflicts, pragmatic considerations often override ideological differences. Turkey imports significant quantities of Iranian natural gas and petroleum products, while both nations share concerns about Kurdish separatism and maintain intelligence cooperation on border security. Trade continues even under U.S. sanctions, with Turkey serving as a sanctions-busting conduit for Iranian goods.
Historical memory further complicates contemporary relations. The Ottoman-Safavid rivalries of centuries past echo in modern strategic competition, with both nations claiming leadership of the Islamic world through different theological and cultural lenses. Iran’s Persian nationalism and Turkey’s Turkic identity create parallel but non-intersecting spheres of influence. In the Caucasus, Iran views Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation with suspicion, fearing encirclement and threats to its own Azerbaijani minority. The Abraham Accords and Turkey’s warming relations with Israel and Gulf Arab states have added another layer of complexity, with Iran perceiving these developments as hostile encirclement. This multidimensional rivalry ensures that Turkey-Iran relations will remain characterized by tactical cooperation within a framework of strategic competition.
Russia: Competition and Coexistence
Turkey and Russia’s relationship is a complex interplay of rivalry and pragmatism. In Syria, Ankara and Moscow back opposing factions but coordinate to avoid direct conflict. In energy, Turkey imports Russian gas while seeking alternatives to reduce dependence. The Black Sea remains a flashpoint, with Turkey’s control over naval access challenging Russian ambitions. Despite tensions, both nations recognize the costs of confrontation, leading to ad hoc cooperation in areas like nuclear energy and tourism.
The Turkey-Russia relationship represents one of the most paradoxical partnerships in contemporary geopolitics. The 2015 downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkey brought the two nations to the brink of conflict, yet within two years they had resumed strategic cooperation. This resilience stems from mutual economic dependencies and shared frustrations with Western policies. Russia’s construction of Turkey’s Akkuyu nuclear power plant represents a multi-billion-dollar commitment, while Turkish construction firms and agricultural exports benefit from Russian markets. Tourism flows between the countries remain substantial, providing crucial foreign exchange for Turkey. The S-400 missile defense system purchase by Ankara, despite NATO opposition, demonstrated Turkey’s willingness to defy Western pressure when its interests align with Moscow.
However, fundamental geopolitical contradictions constrain the relationship’s depth. In Libya, Turkey and Russia support opposing factions in a proxy conflict that has occasionally threatened direct military confrontation. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict revealed competing interests, with Turkey backing Azerbaijan while Russia maintains military bases in Armenia. Most significantly, Turkey’s control of the Turkish Straits under the Montreux Convention gives Ankara leverage over Russian naval access to the Mediterranean, a power Turkey has exercised by restricting warship passage during the Ukraine conflict while maintaining neutrality. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine placed Turkey in a particularly delicate position, forcing it to balance its NATO commitments with economic ties to Russia and its diplomatic ambitions as a mediator. This balancing act—providing Ukraine with armed drones while refusing to join Western sanctions on Russia—exemplifies Turkey’s strategy of maintaining maximum flexibility in a polarizing international environment.
Civilizational Geopolitics: Beyond Geopolitics
Prof. Zan Tao underscores Turkey’s dual role in geopolitics and geo-civilization. Unlike secular European powers, Turkey’s identity as an Islamic and Turkic state shapes its foreign policy. This civilizational dimension explains its outreach to Muslim-majority countries and Turkic republics, where cultural affinity transcends mere strategic interests. However, this approach risks alienating non-Muslim or non-Turkic states, highlighting the limits of identity-based diplomacy in a multipolar world.
Turkey’s civilizational diplomacy manifests through institutions like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), where Ankara seeks leadership, and the Organization of Turkic States, which formalizes Turkey’s role as elder sibling among Turkic nations. This identity politics serves multiple purposes: it mobilizes domestic nationalist sentiment, provides legitimacy for foreign interventions, and creates cultural networks that complement economic ties. The reconstruction of Ottoman-era mosques and cultural sites in the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East symbolizes Turkey’s self-perception as heir to a glorious imperial past with responsibilities toward diaspora communities and co-religionists. Erdoğan’s rhetoric frequently invokes the millet system and Ottoman multiculturalism as models for contemporary governance, positioning Turkey as a civilizational alternative to both Western secularism and Arab or Iranian Islamism.
Yet this civilizational approach contains inherent contradictions and limitations. Turkey’s simultaneous appeals to Islamic unity and Turkic ethnic nationalism create confusion and suspicion—Arab states question Turkey’s commitment to pan-Islamic solidarity when it emphasizes Turkic identity, while Central Asian states with significant non-Turkic populations view ethnic appeals as divisive. In the Balkans, Orthodox Christian nations perceive Turkish cultural initiatives as neo-Ottoman imperialism rather than benign cultural exchange. Furthermore, Turkey’s civilizational diplomacy competes with Saudi Arabia’s religious soft power, Iran’s Shia networks, and the broader trend toward nationalism over transnational identities in the Muslim world. The tension between Turkey’s secular constitutional foundations and its increasingly religious foreign policy discourse also creates domestic fissures, with secular Turks viewing Erdoğan’s civilizational rhetoric as a dangerous departure from Kemalist principles. This identity politics, while mobilizing certain constituencies, simultaneously constrains Turkey’s ability to build truly universal partnerships.
Multipolarity and Strategic Autonomy
Turkey’s 21st-century ambitions reflect a broader shift toward multipolarity. By diversifying alliances and reducing reliance on Western security guarantees, Ankara seeks to assert its independence. This strategy is evident in its neutral stance during the Russia-Ukraine war, its balancing act between China and the U.S., and its cultivation of ties with Russia and Iran. Turkey’s ability to navigate competing powers underscores its growing confidence as a regional hegemon.
Strategic autonomy has become the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy under Erdoğan, reflecting both ideological conviction and pragmatic necessity. Turkey’s experience during the 2016 coup attempt, when Ankara perceived insufficient Western support and suspected American complicity, crystallized a determination to reduce vulnerability to any single power. This has manifested in military diversification—developing indigenous defense industries through programs like the Bayraktar TB2 drone, the KAAN fighter jet project, and domestic missile systems—thereby reducing dependence on U.S. arms supplies that come with political conditions. Turkey’s mediation efforts, from hosting Ukraine-Russia grain negotiations to facilitating Israel-Hamas prisoner exchanges, position Ankara as an indispensable broker whose neutrality derives value from its relationships with all parties.
However, strategic autonomy comes with significant costs and contradictions. Turkey’s economic vulnerabilities—high inflation, currency instability, and foreign debt—limit its ability to truly act independently, as it remains reliant on Western financial markets and institutions. The S-400 purchase resulted in removal from the F-35 program, demonstrating that defying the U.S. carries concrete penalties. Turkey’s balancing act increasingly resembles a high-wire act without a safety net, as both Western and non-Western powers question Ankara’s reliability as a partner. The concept of “strategic autonomy” itself may be partially illusory for a middle power whose economy and security ultimately depend on access to larger systems. Turkey’s challenge is to determine how much independence it can achieve without becoming isolated—a fate that would undermine the very influence it seeks to enhance through autonomous action.
Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
Erdoğan’s leadership has been instrumental in Turkey’s geopolitical resurgence. His neo-Ottoman vision appeals to a domestic base yearning for global relevance, while his authoritarian style ensures policy continuity. However, economic challenges, including inflation and currency devaluation, constrain Turkey’s ambitions. Balancing domestic stability with external expansion remains a critical challenge for Ankara.
The personalization of Turkish foreign policy under Erdoğan has created both opportunities and vulnerabilities. His direct engagement with world leaders, from Putin to Trump to Gulf monarchs, enables rapid decision-making and personal diplomacy that bureaucratic processes might stall. This personalist approach aligns with Turkey’s presidential system, which concentrates power in the executive and allows Erdoğan to override institutional resistance to bold foreign policy moves. Domestically, foreign policy successes—such as military operations in Syria, the Libya intervention, and high-profile diplomatic mediations—serve as legitimacy-building exercises that distract from economic problems and rally nationalist sentiment across the political spectrum. The narrative of Turkey “standing up” to Western powers particularly resonates with voters who feel humiliated by European rejection of Turkey’s EU membership bid and perceived Western double standards.
Yet this fusion of personal rule and foreign policy activism creates systemic risks. Erdoğan’s advanced age and the lack of clear succession planning raise questions about policy continuity should leadership change. Opposition parties, particularly the CHP and İYİ Party, while nationalistic, differ on specifics of Turkey’s regional engagements and relationship with NATO, suggesting potential policy shifts after electoral transitions. Economic constraints pose the most immediate threat to Turkey’s ambitions—the 2018 currency crisis and ongoing inflation above 60% demonstrate how economic instability can rapidly constrain foreign policy options by limiting resources for military operations, aid programs, and infrastructure investments. Growing public frustration with economic hardship while resources flow to Syrian refugees and foreign interventions has created a constituency skeptical of overseas commitments. Furthermore, Erdoğan’s polarizing domestic policies—crackdowns on opposition, media restrictions, and judicial overreach—damage Turkey’s international reputation and complicate relations with democratic nations. The symbiotic relationship between domestic authoritarianism and assertive foreign policy may ultimately prove unsustainable if economic performance continues to deteriorate.
Regional Perceptions: From Brotherhood to Rivalry
Turkey’s influence in Eurasia elicits mixed reactions. In Central Asia, Turkic states view Ankara as a cultural and economic partner, while non-Turkic nations like Tajikistan remain wary. In the Balkans, Turkey’s religious diplomacy faces resistance from Orthodox Christian populations. Among global powers, Russia and Iran perceive Turkey’s rise as a threat, while China and the U.S. see it as an opportunity for partnership or competition, respectively.
The divergence in regional perceptions of Turkey reflects the complexity of its identity and objectives. In the Turkic world, Turkey’s role oscillates between admired elder brother and overbearing patron. While Turkish investment and cultural programs are welcomed in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, concerns about Turkish dominance and the imposition of Ankara’s preferences persist. Central Asian leaders appreciate Turkey as a counterbalance to Russian and Chinese influence but resist becoming satellites in a Turkish-led order. The 2021 formation of the Organization of Turkic States formalized this relationship but also revealed its limits—member states coordinate on cultural and economic matters while maintaining independent foreign policies, particularly regarding Russia and China.
In the Middle East, Turkey’s standing has undergone dramatic shifts. The Arab Spring initially positioned Turkey as a democratic model for the region, but its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and interventions in Libya and Syria alienated Gulf monarchies and Egypt. The subsequent rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt demonstrated pragmatic recalibration, yet mutual suspicions remain. Palestinians view Turkey as a vocal champion, but its Abraham Accords-era cooperation with Israel complicates this perception. In the Balkans, Turkey’s Ottoman heritage is simultaneously an asset and liability—while Bosnian Muslims and Albanians welcome Turkish engagement, Greek and Serbian populations perceive Turkish influence through the lens of historical conflicts. Among Western allies, Turkey is increasingly seen as unreliable—its obstruction of Sweden’s NATO membership, military operations against U.S.-allied Kurdish forces in Syria, and refusal to fully align with Western sanctions on Russia have eroded trust. This kaleidoscope of perceptions reflects Turkey’s liminal status: too Western for Eastern powers, too Eastern for Western allies, too Islamic for secular states, and too secular for Islamist movements—a position that provides flexibility but also ensures perpetual friction.
The Future: A Pivotal Player in Eurasia
Turkey’s trajectory as a geo-strategic chess player is poised to shape 21st-century Eurasian order. Its ability to leverage historical legacies, economic clout, and strategic ambiguity will determine its influence. While challenges like domestic instability and regional rivalries persist, Ankara’s adaptability and central location ensure its relevance. As global powers vie for control, Turkey stands at the nexus of conflict and cooperation, a testament to its enduring geopolitical significance.
The next decade will test whether Turkey can consolidate its gains or whether its reach has exceeded its grasp. Several scenarios appear possible. In an optimistic trajectory, Turkey successfully leverages its mediator role to become an indispensable hub linking Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, with the Middle Corridor emerging as a genuine alternative to Russian and maritime routes. Economic reforms restore investor confidence, enabling sustainable growth that funds both military modernization and soft power initiatives. In this scenario, Turkey becomes a genuine regional power with influence comparable to historic empires, capable of shaping outcomes in multiple theaters simultaneously. Democratic reforms could even restore EU accession prospects, giving Turkey access to European markets and institutions while maintaining strategic autonomy.
A more pessimistic scenario sees Turkey’s multiple balancing acts collapse under their own contradictions. Economic crisis forces retrenchment from foreign commitments, while domestic instability consumes leadership attention. Regional rivals successfully counter Turkish initiatives—Russia reasserts dominance in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Arab states contain Turkish influence in the Middle East, and Iran blocks Turkish ambitions in Iraq and Syria. NATO membership becomes increasingly hollow as Turkey drifts away from Western security architecture without gaining reliable alternative partners. China and Russia extract concessions from a weakened Turkey without offering genuine strategic partnership. In this trajectory, Turkey becomes a middle power with declining influence, its ambitions remembered as brief overreach during a unique moment of great power distraction. The most likely outcome lies between these extremes: Turkey will remain a significant but not dominant regional power, capable of affecting outcomes in neighboring regions but unable to impose its will, perpetually balancing between competing power centers while managing internal challenges. Turkey’s enduring geographic centrality and institutional capacity ensure it cannot be ignored, even as structural constraints prevent it from achieving the neo-Ottoman greatness its leadership envisions.
In conclusion, Turkey’s rise is not merely a revival of Ottoman glory but a modern reimagining of its role in a multipolar world. By balancing tradition with pragmatism, Ankara has carved out a unique niche, asserting itself as a bridge between East and West, and a force to reckon with in Eurasia’s evolving geopolitics.
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