Adjacent to the armed and humanitarian offensives in Syria, the flourishing military alliance with China and the public sympathy secured in the “independent media” (or alternative) segment, Russia is in a process of diplomatic conquests. However, the Federation’s ties with Iran are much more delicate than they seem at first glance because, historically speaking, Iran and Russia have been in a precarious balance of concessions and threats, Persian concessions and Tsarist/Soviet threats.

The Kremlin does not see Tehran as a true friend, it is more of a conjuncture partner, as was seen during the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. The things that connect them are relatively easy to point out. Russian support for the regime in Syria is in the interest of Iran, which thus ensures the existence of a friend in the region with access to the Mediterranean Sea. In the event of the fall of the Syrian government and an Iraq crippled by ISIS, the Islamic republic would become the next target.

The Iranian industry requires new investments and technology, usually these come from China, Russia and as a result of the “atomic deal”, from European countries such as Italy, France, Germany and Sweden. Russia is a geographically close state, with the two countries having an opening to the Caspian Sea, and their economic and industrial ties began to prosper especially after the change of the Iranian political system in 1979. Prior to this date, the Shah was clearly pro-Western and an ally of the US. However, the Soviet Union and the newly formed Islamic Republic did not have a special understanding in the context of the Iran-Iraq war, moreover, the USSR began to actively support Iraq after 1986.

Russia’s interests in the case of Iran include maintaining stability in the region because it does not want a pro-US regime to come to Tehran (which would thus become a considerable military threat), nor the seizure of Iranian territories by terrorists (from where the scourge could extend to the Caucasus and other areas with Muslims in Russia). Russia also wants access to the Persian Gulf, in which two technical solutions are proposed, a Caspian-Persian Gulf canal or a high-speed rail route. Probably this is also why Moscow wants to grant a loan of more than $2 billion for infrastructure projects.

A possible Russian-Turkish-Iranian alliance should not be excluded. The problem in this trio is obviously Syria, but premature elements of a reconciliation between Turkey and Syria are beginning to come to light. China is a less vocal partner on Iran, but it is the most economically active. Russia’s project to co-opt the Islamic Republic within Eurasia comes within the framework of the Federation’s pivot to the east and the plan for a pro-Russian Asian continent.